ON THE EDITIONS OF The Will to Power. CHRONOLOGY OF NIETZSCHE's WORKS. FACSIMILES from Nietzsche's manuscript. NIETZSCHE'S PREFACE. The Project Gutenberg EBook of The Will to Power, Book III and IV, by Friedrich Nietzsche This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and . Project Gutenberg's The Will to Power, Book I and II, by Friedrich Nietzsche This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and most other.
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THE WILL TO POWER (Nov.!7-March 11 CONTENTS: BOOK I - EUROPEAN NIHILISM BOOK II - CRITIQUE OF HIGHEST VALUES HITHERTO BOOK III. Assembled by Nietzsche's sister after his death, The Will to Power is a collection of the philosopher's reflections and theories taken from his. FRIEDRICH N I ETZSCHE Translated by Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale Edited by Walter Kaufmann A VINTAGE GIANT THE WILL TO POWER P»-.
The type of God after the type of creative spirits, of "great men. Transitoriness could be interpreted as enjoyment of productive and destructive force, as continual creation. The Eternal Recurrence My philosophy brings the triumphant idea of which all other modes of thought will ultimately perish.
It is the great cultivating idea: the races that cannot bear it stand condemned; those who find it the greatest benefit are chosen to rule. The hammer: to provoke a fearful decision, to confront Europe with the consequences: whether its will "wills" destruction. Prevention of reduction to mediocrity. Rather destruction! A prophecy. Presentation of the doctrine and its theoretical presuppositions and consequences.
Proof of the doctrine. Probable consequences of its being believed it makes everything break open. Its place in history as a mid-point. Period of greatest danger. Foundation of an oligarchy above peoples and their interests: education to a universally human politics.
Counterpart of Jesuitism. The two great philosophical points of view devised by Germans : a that of becoming, of development. Everything becomes and recurs eternally--escape is impossible!
The idea of recurrence as a selective principle, in the service of strength and barbarism!! Ripeness of man for this idea. The idea [of the eternal recurrence]: the presuppositions that would have to be true if it were true.
Its consequences. As the hardest idea: its probable effect if it were not prevented, i. Means of enduring it: the revaluation of all values. No longer joy in certainty but uncertainty; no longer "cause and effect" but the continually creative; no longer will to preservation but to power; no longer the humble expression, "everything is merely subjective," but "it is also our work!
If there were for it some unintended final state, this also must have been reached. If it were in any way capable of a pausing and becoming fixed, of "being," then all becoming would long since have come to an end, along with all thinking, all "spirit. The old habit, however, of associating a goal with every event and a guiding, creative God with the world, is so powerful that it requires an effort for a thinker not to fall into thinking of the very aimlessness of the world as intended.
This notion--that the world intentionally avoids a goal and even knows artifices for keeping itself from entering into a circular course--must occur to all those who would like to force on the world the ability for eternal novelty, i.
The world, even if it is no longer a god, is still supposed to be capable of the divine power of creation, the power of infinite transformations; it is supposed to consciously prevent itself from returning to any of its old forms; it is supposed to possess not only the intention but the means of every one of its movements at every moment so as to escape goals, final states, repetitions--and whatever else may follow from such an unforgivably insane way of thinking and desiring.
It is still the old religious way of thinking and desiring, a kind of longing to believe that in some way the world is after all like the old beloved, infinite, boundlessly creative God--that in some way "the old God still lives"--that longing of Spinoza which was expressed in the words "deus sive natura" [God or nature.
What, then, is the law and belief with which the decisive change, the recently attained preponderance of the scientific spirit over the religious, God-inventing spirit, is most clearly formulated? Is it not: the world, as force, may not be thought of as unlimited, for it cannot be so thought of; we forbid ourselves the concept of an infinite force as incompatible with the concept "force. But in an indefinite space it would have to have been reached.
Likewise in a spherical space. The shape of space must be the cause of eternal movement, and ultimately of all "imperfection.
The measure of force as magnitude as fixed, but its essence in flux. At any precise moment of a force, the absolute conditionality of a new distribution of all its forces is given: it cannot stand still. To me, on the contrary, everything seems far too valuable to be so fleeting: I seek an eternity for everything: ought one to pour the most precious salves and wines into the sea? Nietzsche's Metaethics Nietzsche holds that moral i. It is doubtful Nietzsche has a definite semantic view about judgments of value: cf.
Hussain , esp. There is, on the skeptical view at issue here, a special problem about the objectivity of value. No one, to date, has construed Nietzsche as an I-Realist, but Schacht and Wilcox , among many others, have defended an N-Realist reading, while Foot has defended a P-Non-Realist reading. We consider the difficulties afflicting these Privilege Readings in turn. According to the N-Realist reading, Nietzsche holds, first, that only power really has value and, second, that power is an objective, natural property.
Nietzsche's evaluative perspective is privileged, in turn, because it involves asssessing i prudential value value for an agent in terms of degree of power, and ii non-prudential value in terms of maximization of prudential value i. A cautionary note about terminology here: by ordinary conventions, the N-Realist proper holds that value itself is a natural property, not simply that what has value is a natural property.
In the theory of value, then, one might plausibly think of Nietzsche as being a kind of naturalist in the sense of resisting religious and quasi-religious theories that view goodness as supervening on non-natural e. What exactly is Nietzsche's argument on the N-Realist reading? When pressed, commentators are never very clear. Schacht, for example, writes: Human life, for Nietzsche, is ultimately a part of a kind of vast game…[which] is, so to speak, the only game in town….
The nature of the game, he holds, establishes a standard for the evaluation of everything falling within its compass. The availability of this standard places evaluation on footing that is as firm as that on which the comprehension of life and the world stands. From the fact, for example, that all life obeys the laws of fundamental physics, nothing follows about the appropriate standard of value. What Schacht and others seem to have in mind is something like John Stuart Mill's argument for utilitarianism, which proceeds from the premise that since happiness is the only thing people desire or aim for, it follows that happiness is the only thing that possesses intrinsic value.
This argument, though, is famously unsuccessful: from the fact that only happiness is desired, nothing at all follows about what ought to be desired. Attempts to construe Nietzsche's argument in an analogous way encounter similar problems Leiter explores the analogy in detail. P , of course, is not valid, a point to which we will return.
Notice, now, that the same type of argument seems to capture what the N-Realist construal of Nietzsche has in mind.
If P is valid, Value Nihilism false, and the descriptive doctrine of the will to power is true, then the normative conclusion about power, which Schacht is after, seems to follow. Note, of course, that the Millian Model argument as formulated so far would show only that power is what is non-morally valuable or good for an agent. Of course, if the Millian Model argument for prudential value or non-moral goodness does not work, then that provides a very strong if defeasible reason for supposing that there is no further argument for the related account of non-prudential value as consisting in maximization of power.
The first problem, of course, is that P is not valid. While from the fact that x is heard, it follows that x is audible, it does not follow from that fact that x is desired that x is desirable in the sense necessary for the argument.
Yet in claiming that pleasure or power are valuable, Mill and the N-Realist Nietzsche are advancing a normative thesis. The truth of this normative thesis, however, simply does not follow from the corresponding descriptive thesis.
Many, of course, have thought this too facile a response. How does the IC help? Recall P : P To show that something is desirable i. Now the IC puts a constraint on what things can, in fact, be desirable or valuable: namely, only those things that agents can, in fact, care about or desire. But what happens, then, if we grant the truth of Descriptive Hedonism: namely, that only pleasure is, in fact, desired. In that case, it would now follow that only pleasure is desirable ought to be desired assuming, again, that Value Nihilism is false.
That is, since something ought to be desired only if it can be desired internalism , then if only x can be desired, then only x ought to be desired assuming that Value Nihilism is false.
Will this argument rescue the N-Realist Nietzsche? Two obstacles remain.
The first, and perhaps less serious one, is that we must have some reason for accepting the IC — or, more modestly, some reason for thinking Nietzsche accepts it. It is not clear, however, that there are adequate textual grounds for saying where Nietzsche stands on this question. Since the IC does, however, seem to be presupposed by the Nietzschean remarks from the Nachlass that support N-Realism — in the sense that such remarks do not constitute a good argument without the IC — let us grant that Nietzsche accepts the IC , and let us simply put aside the contentious issue of whether we ought to accept the IC as a general philosophical matter.
A second difficulty will still remain: namely, that the argument for N-Realism still depends on the truth of the relevant descriptive thesis, in Nietzsche's case, the doctrine of the will to power. This presents two problems.
First, in the works Nietzsche chose to publish, it seems clear that he did not, in fact, accept the doctrine in the strong form required for the N-Realist argument namely, that it is only power that persons ever aim for or desire.
Second, it is simply not a plausible doctrine in its strong form. Since the N-Realist Nietzschean conclusion is that only power is valuable, power must be the only thing that is, in fact, desired assuming, again, that something is valuable, i.
Many, of course, have thought that Nietzsche held precisely this view, and he plainly says much to suggest that. The difficulty is that Nietzsche says other things which might suggest that the stronger remarks are misleading; for example: Life itself is to my mind the instinct for growth, for durability, for an accumulation of forces, for power: where the will to power is lacking there is decline.
It is my contention that all the supreme values of mankind lack this will…. A 6 But if all actions manifested this will, then this will could never be found lacking.
This passage is not atypical. Three other general textual considerations count against attributing the strong doctrine of the will to power to Nietzsche. Second, the view at issue presupposes an unusually strong doctrine of the will to power: a doctrine, to the effect, that all life actions, events reflects the will to power.
Routledge, , pp. They add to this that in order to let the world be, the subject must be divested of its subjectivity, must become anonymous i. Thus the idea is that consciousness constitutes the world as it, in turn, is constituted by the world. These interpretations concur on the central point: What is the specific quality of human participation in nature, according to Malick? The New World provides an answer to this question.
I am not convinced that our strivings and their mere being are as remote from each other as Critchley suggests, especially in the light of The New World. Cinema, Aesthetics, Subjectivity London: British Film Institute, , p. You are our mother. We, your field of corn. We rise from out of the soul of you. As his ship sails up the James River, Smith too reaches skyward — while looking through the bars in the deck; he is in the brig, in chains, having made remarks construed as mutinous on the voyage over.
This seems to be a contrast central to the film. On the one hand: The English are shown in this light throughout the first half of the film: The first shot of Smith in chains is indicative of this tension in all its varied forms: Along the same lines, the film is filled with shots of interiors, but with the camera looking out, at people, animals, or just space.
The interior seems to define the fundamental perspective of the English: The whole problem of the film, when seen in this light would then be to chart this tension, the starkness of the contrast between two distinct and opposed social orders.
The chains Smith is in at the beginning of the film would therefore represent the chains of civilization, of which Pocahontas is free, at least at first. Of course, one would have to add to this picture the mitigation of this dualism, as undertaken by Pocahontas in her assimilation, her baptism and eventually her marriage to John Rolfe Christian Bale.
On this reading, the logic of the film would rest on a dynamic of like and unlike, in which unlike must become like in order for the tension between the bars of the brig and the open sky to be resolved. As Pocahontas says to Smith at the beginning of her assimilation: In fact, this tidy story of cultural difference and assimilation collapses as soon as the contrasts of the opening sequence begin to unfold. Or even before. At first, this seems to raise a thorny question: But to raise this sort of concern would be to miss the point by tacitly reinforcing the cultural dichotomies that Malick deconstructs in the film.
It may be more fruitful, at least provisionally, to look at things the other way around: The invocation is in this way bound up with a radical questioning that Pocahontas herself articulates explicitly a little later in the film, when she asks herself: Where do you live? In the sky, the clouds, the sea? Show me your face. Give me a sign. Yet the same is true of Smith, who asks himself very similar questions early in the film; for example: What they are asking themselves is what makes them human and how they should understand themselves as creatures with natural drives and passions.
Of course, their questioning may seem ambiguous in the context of the narrative. Are they not asking about their love for each other? To the extent that the question of their love only arises later, we should perhaps already suspect that the point here is to explore the deeper question of what binds them together in nature — not just as would-be lovers, as the deeply misleading narrative would have us think.
However, the claim is not that Malick ultimately denies the social reality of cultural or amorous tensions; on the contrary, he affirms it in its stark obviousness. But these tensions are clearly not his central concern; they are only an occasion for exploring the enigma of nature and human nature, instinct and reason. At this level, love and cultural difference are relegated to the status of epiphenomena or manifestations of natural processes. To summarize: It is only on the level of the content of these practices, one might say, that cultural difference becomes an issue: On the level of their form, they rather resemble each other.
Thus the at times very loose cohesion of both groups is based around beliefs and motives proper to each group, but the fact that there is and can be such cohesion is shared: Admittedly, many of the narrative elements of the film do not seem to lend themselves to this reading.
In spite of the chasm that separates them, then, and even in the very expression of this cultural divide, Malick insists that their difference is purely perspectival and that at root that they share a common logic, a common reason that engenders their respective worlds and defines their relation to nature.
That on its own would not be the most radical claim. And it would be a rather ambiguous claim, hovering indecisively between the philosophical assertion of universal subjectivity and a New- Agey — and historically false — affirmation of universal humanity such as we see in the Disney version of the Pocahontas story.
But on the contrary, the strength of the film is that it does not stop there, that is, with the idea of a common humanity. The question is rather: To anticipate somewhat on what follows: In other words, it denies the superiority or dominance of rational beings over nature by affirming the natural character of reason.
It is just that we have the capacity to see this war for what it is. Gradually, Smith is separated from his compatriots and his captive guides, until he is alone in the swamp, in full armour, armed only with a sword and a pistol. As Smith makes his way through the swamp, hoping to find the native camp, he is attacked from all sides by arrows and club-wielding natives. His pistol holds a single shot; he fires on one of his attackers, but they outnumber him.
Once his pistol is discharged, he is left with his sword and parrying dagger; but encumbered as he is, he cannot prevail and is quickly taken prisoner. What is the significance of this highly artificial scene, in which Smith is reduced to fighting alone in the swamp, where he is barely able to move because of the armour he is wearing? Obviously, the answer involves self-preservation — there is no other reason for the armour.
Adorno writes: The emphasis that philosophy puts on the constitutive power of the subjective moment … cuts us off from the truth. Species like the dinosaur triceratops or the rhinoceros haul around the armour that protects them, like a prison they grow into, and which they try in vain to shed or so it seems, anthropomorphically. Their imprisonment in their own survival mechanism may be what explains the special ferocity of rhinoceroses, just as it explains the unacknowledged and therefore all the more terrifying ferocity of homo sapiens.
The subjective moment is set into the objective one, as it were; but as something limiting to which the subject must submit, the subjective moment is itself objective.
Essentially, the idea is that there is no use pretending that there exists some kind of heroic subjectivity that pits itself against blind nature or that is able to stand outside the world as it constitutes it. Nature and the human desire to master nature are one and the same thing.
Or, more generally, consciousness and objective nature are two sides of the same coin to the extent that consciousness is a natural survival mechanism that evolved with and defines the human species. Just as the triceratops and its armour are inseparable, we, as natural creatures, and the myriad methods by which we divide and conquer nature are inseparable too. Adorno, Negative Dialectics, trans.
Ashton London: Routledge, , p. Adorno, Gesammelte Schriften, ed. Rolf Tiedemann, 20 vols. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, , vol. I provide the page number of the English translation of the text for ease of reference, though the quoted text is a retranslation of the original.
Thus, we, as knowers and doers, are caught in a web of natural possibility, and every effort to remove ourselves from this web only results in further entanglement. We cannot disentangle reason from nature because their entwinement is precisely what makes us the creatures we are. We cannot escape this predicament, but we can at least adopt a perspective that does not muddle the problem: It is in this sense that the classic emphasis on a priori, constitutive subjective rationality is false.
This capacity to construct forms, to see patterns, rhythms or, in short, the ability to see identity in difference, is what we normally think of as the essence of the human being, as defined by Aristotle. We are supposed to be rational animals and, moreover, the only rational animal.
As he says: What is essential in 14 Friedrich Nietzsche, Kritische Studienausgabe, ed. Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari, 2 ed. Walter de Gruyter, , , vol. This edition hereafter referred to by the abbreviation KSA.